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Introduction 
The issue  of market  power-the ability  to  influence prtce or  quan-
tity flow  in  the marketplace-is quite important in agriculture.  Farmers 
often face market power, which can significantly affect their well-being and 
the allocative efficiency of these markets.  At one level,  one is interested 
in investigating whether or not market power is  actually being exercised. 
High industry concentration is not a sufficient condition for exercising mar-
ket  power.  Furthermore, market power may be exercised in nonconcen-
trated industries in the presence of legally binding arrangements OIl  price 
and/or quantity, such as those under federal marketing orders and market-
ing boards. At another level, one is interested in identifying the sources of 
market power to provide useful information to the polic.y-making process. 
Perhaps, the most plausible conceptual and empirical approach to mea-
suring and testing the degree of market power is  provided by Appelbaum. 
Assuming  identic.al  marginal  costs  and  conjectural  variation  elasticities 
across firms,  Appelbaum developed  an econometric model  that  converts 
the price/marginal cost gap to a measurable and testable oligopoly index. 
The approach has been applied to the U.S.  beef-packing industry (Azzam 
et  al.,  Schroeter) and marketing orders (Taylor and Kilmer).  Other ap-
proaches have been  applied  to  tomatoes  (Just  and  Chern;  Melnick  and 
Shalit), and cigarettes (Sumner). Although the focus of previous work has 
been on  "measuring and testing,"  a  comprehensive empirical analysis of 
the sources of market  power and the effects  of international commodi  ty 
agreements on domestic market power is lacking. 
This paper develops a  methodology for  measuring, testing, and identi-
1 fying  the sources of oligopsony power in the Haitian coffee  market.  The 
methodology is  based on the work of Appelbaum, but is  adapted to the 
oligopsonistic case.  Other novel features include supply response of a peren-
nial crop,  accounting for  the export and domestic markets, institutional 
changes, and endogenizing the number of exporters in the market. 
Conceptual Framework 
The  Haitian  Coffee Market 
The Haitian coffee  market provides  a  good  case study for  meaSUrIng 
the  degree  and  determining  the  sources  of market  power.  Aside  from 
the Haitian government, which sets export taxes and prescribes licensing 
requirements  to  intermediaries,  there  are five  major  participants in  the 
Haitian coffee  marketing chain:  producers, primary intermediaries (spec-
ulators), exporters, domestic wholesalers, and consumers.
l  In 1984, there 
were approximately 250,000 producers, 800 speculators (primary interme-
diaries), 18 exporters, and several thousand domestic wholesalers operating 
in the market (Seguino). 
The average Haitian coffee producer is a small multiproduct farmer who 
can best be characterized as a peasant. Intermediaries who buy coffee from 
the farmers are called "speculateurs" (herein called speculators).  Specula-
tors provide coffee growers with credit needed for harvesting and even for 
personal needs, and the loans are repayable in coffee or money.  The effec-
tive interest rates on these loans have been reported to be as high as 1  00 
percent. per year (Seguino).  Speculators handle coffee for both the domestic 
and export markets. 
2 Coffee for the domestic market is handled by domestic wholesalers who 
buy coffee from speculators and sell it to local merchants. Many wholesalers 
and merchants not only deal in coffee but also distribute other agricultural 
commodities.  Also, wholesalers are very mobile and are not bound to any 
particular speculator for  their  capital or  coffee  supply needs.  Although 
the speculators also buy coffee from the peasants for  the export market, 
they  essentially  act  as  agents  of the  exporters.  For instance,  a  survey 
reports that 66 percent of the speculators interviewed are tied to particular 
exporters  who  provide them  with  interest-free credit  (Capital  Consult). 
The same survey reported t.hat  86  percent of speculators perceived that 
the exporters set the farm-gate price. The remaining 14 percent perceived 
that  the price was  set  by the exporters as  a  result of world prices.  On 
the world market, however, exporters are price takers, since Haiti accounts 
for less than .01  percent of total world exports.  In  1960, coffee exporters 
formed an association that, in 1977, established an internal quota system 
to coordinate their purchases for export. 
A key difference between the domestic and export markets is that buy-
ing for  the export market involves  considerable barriers to entry due to 
the informal arrangements between exporters and speculators and between 
speculators and growers and the large financial requirements for  entering 
the  coffee  export  trade successfully,  estimated to  be  at least  $1  million 
in the late '70s (Girault).  Very few  entrepreneurs in Haiti-where the per 
capita income is approximately $200 per year-have access to this amount 
of capital or can bear the risk of such a relatively large investment. Buying 
for the domestic market is relatively competitive mainly due to arbitrage in 
wholesaling and the much larger number of wholesalers vis-a-vis exporters. 
Under this situation, collusive behavior may arise to  t.he  extent  that ex-
3 porters recognize their mutual interdependence.  According to Markham, 
collusive price leadership works  best  when products are close substitutes 
and are amenable to a  single price policy; this appears to be true for the 
Haitian coffee market. 
Graphical AnalY3i3 
Figure 1 conceptualizes the foregoing situation in the domestic and ex-
port markets. Borrowing from the dominant firm theory, supply for exports 
(Q) is derived as the residual of total supply (Q') after purchases by whole-
salers for domestic consumption (Qd).  This curve is shown on the left panel 
along with the respective perceived marginal input or factor cost associated 
with coffee.  To maximize profits, exporters should set  a  price of coffee 
so that their perceived marginal input cost equals their value of marginal 
product. This point corresponds to price P* paid to the farmers and the Q* 
level of exports (see competitive equilibrium at the point where Q=  VMP). 
A  further  complication  arises  when one  considers  the export  quotas 
imposed by the International Coffee Agreement (ICA). Presumably, if the 
ICA  cartel is  effective  in  raising  the  world  price of coffee,  the  value  of 
marginal product of coffee  for  exports increases, shifting from the VMP 
curve to V M PO,I.  Q~ca denotes an effective quota that results in a  lower 
level of exports and a lower farm-gate price of coffee  (p~ca), compared with 
the (P*, Q*)  or (P*·, Q**)  solutions.  Whether the international cartel is 
effective in raising world prices does not alter the basic conclusions from the 
analysis, because the quota solution will prevail with V M P or V M PO,I .  An 
ineffective quot.a is depicted at.  Qica . In sum, if an export quot.a is binding 
the  quot.a will dictate a  constrained equilibrium in the export market.  If 
a  quota is ineffective,  the exporters  would operate where their perceived 
4 marginal input cost equals their value of marginal product. 
A  Mathematical Model 
For the purpose of this paper, market participants are aggregated into 
three groups:  exporters, coffee growers, and domestic wholesalers.  Coffee 
growers are price takers, and their market supply is given by Q' =  f(P, Z')' 
where Q' is  quantity of coffee supplied, P  is  coffee  price received, and Z· 
is  a  vector of relevant  variables other than the price of coffee.  Domestic 
consumers are also price takers, and their derived market demand is given 
by Qd  =  g(P, Zd)  where Qd is the quantity of coffee consumed domestically, 
and Zd  is a  vector of other relevant variables that affect demand.  Letting 
the  domestic wholesalers  be  competitive,  the  coffee  supply available for 
exports is given by Q' - Qd  =  Q.  Let qi  denote the amount of coffee bought 
by the ith exporter and let the total amount bought by all exporters be given 
by Q  =  L: qi(i  =  1,···,  N). The exporters' profit-maximization problem is 
given by 
(1) 
where Pw  is the f.o.b.  world price of coffee received by exporters t
a  is the 
tax rate on coffee  exports imposed by the Haitian government, and ei  is 
the intermediary's processing and handling cost.  The first-order condition 
for profit maximization is 
a7ri  a  ae
i  ap 
- =  Pw(l - t  ) - - - P - -qi  =  o. 
a~  a~  a~ 
(2) 
Applying the chain rule and multiplying and dividing by Q, leads to the 
perceived impact of coffee expenditures through change in prices  given by 
(3) 
5 where 0i  =  (8Q/8qi)(qdQ)  is  the conjectural variation elasticity,  an ex-
porter's perception of the change in purchases by all exporters in response 
to a  1 percent change in own purchases.  Analogous to Appelbaum's con-
jectural elasticity, Oi  ranges from 0 for perfect competit.ive behavior t.o  1 for 
perfect collusion or monopsonistic behavior. Rewriting equation (2), 
a  8Ci  Oi 
Pw(1  - t  ) - 8qi  - P(l + -:ry)  =  0,  (4) 
where 7]  is  the price elasticity of market supply available for exports.  To 
maximize profits, an exporter equates net value of marginal product (first 
two terms) to perceived marginal input cost (last term). To measure oligop-
sony power, consider the analogue of the Lerner index for the ith interme-
diary and use equation (4) to obtain 
L  - V M Pi  - P  _  °i  (5) 
i  - P  - -:ry' 
where V M Pi  is  the after-tax value of marginal product of qi  previously 
defined.  Li ranges from 0 for perfect competition to 1/7] for a monopsonist.  2 
This measure is  the  buying power analogue of Appelbaum's measure of 
oligopoly power. An aggregate Lerner index, computed from the individual 
intermediaries' Lerner indexes is given by 
O i 
L  = L -8i, 
i  7] 
(6) 
where 8i  =  qdQ is the intermediary's share of the coffee market.  At equi-
librium let the marginal marketing cost and conjectural variation elastic-
ity be the same across intermediaries (8C
i /8qi  =  mCi  =  mCj =  mc and 
O J = OJ  = 0 for all i  and j).3 An aggregate price-setting behavior of inter-
mediaries, based individually on equation (4) can be described as 
p . =  Pw(1 - t
a
)  - me 
- ( 1 -+ 8) 
'1 
6 
(7  ) Equation (7) depicts pricing behavior when an export quota imposed by 
the International Coffee Agreement is not effective. If  this quota is effective, 
the constrained solution occurs at a  price at which the ICA quota (Qica) 
equals supply available for exports, namely pica.  More generally, 
(8) 
where pica  is the price obtained under the ICA quota (QICA  =  Q)  and p. 
is the price obtained from equation (7).  Oligopsony power is measured by 
the aggregate Lerner index (L =  fJ/,,,)  or in the case of binding ICA quotas, 
the constrained Lerner index can be measured by (VMP-P)/P. 
Econometric Procedures 
Coffee production involves two features:  potential production and the 
proportion of potential production that is harvested.  When the reduced 
form equation for the coffee supply model presented by Wickens and Green-
field is modified, coffee production in Haiti can be specified as 
m  •  r 
Q:  =!3o + L!3i+1Pt-i +  L  !3jDt-j +  L  !3kSkt +  !3IQ:-l  - !3mQ:-2 + ut  (9) 
i=O  j=m+l 
where Dt- j  denotes hurricanes occurring in year t  - j, Sk  is  the price of 
substitute  k,  and lagged  quantities  capture  the  biennial cycle  and past 
investments. Domestic consumption is modeled as 
Qt =aO+alPt+ LajZf+ U:,  (10) 
j=2 
where Qt is total quantity consumed domest.ically, Pt  is the farm level price 
of coffee, and Zd denotes other variables affecting demand. When equatiolls 
7 (9) and (10) are used, the price elasticity of supply available for export is 
given by 
A  8Q t Pt  • Q:  d Q1  • 
ryt  =  8P
t 
Qt  =  €t Qt +  €t  Q~ > €t,  (11 ) 
where Qt  =  Q: - Q1  and denotes exports, and €:  and €1  are the price elas-
ticity of equations (9) and (10) in absolute value.  In other words, the price 
elasticity of supply for exports becomes greater as domestic consumption 
grows. 
To operationalize equation (7), all variables and parameters can be ob-
tained, except for 8, the conjectural elasticity.  A novel feature of this paper 
is identifying and testing the sources of oligopsony power by introducing 
more plausible explanatory variables than past studies.  Previous studies 
have modeled conjectural elasticity as  a  function of input prices (Appel-
baum; Schroeter; Taylor and Kilmer) or a function of a concentration ratio 
(Azzam, Lopez).4  More specifically, the conjectural elasticity is  presumed 
to be determined by 
where Nt is the number of exporters, a  measure for market structure and 
potentiality of collusion. Yt  and ol are producer's income level and variabil-
ity from farm activities, including coffee,  to account for oligopsony power 
attributable to financing by intermediaries.  Lundahl notes that the rural 
credit interest rate is linked to peasant's income risk.  BO  ARDt  accounts 
for the establishment of the Haitian Exporters Board Association in 1960, a 
potential mechanism for collusion among the exporters. QUOTAt  accounts 
for the establishment of the Quota Administration Association by exporters 
in 1977, which coordinates inte1'7wl export.  quotas among exporters differ-
ent from the exte1'nal quotas imposed by lCA. The expect.ecl  signs of the 
8 parameters are  A1, A2, <  0  and  A3, A4, A5  >  O.  The magnitudes of these 
parameters represent the direct proportion by which the Lerner index of 
oligopsony power changes with changes in these variables. 
A  serious estimation problem may arise from  the endogeneity of the 
number of exporters in equation (12).  Cutthroat competition, persistent 
losses,  and bankruptcies among exporters  before  the  1960s fostered  the 
creation of the Board Association.  Despite this, the number of exporters 
has been slowly declining in recent decades.  Adapting the work of Clarke 
and Davies, it is presumed that the number of exporters is a function of the 
degree of collusion, the price elasticity of export supply, and the variation 
in costs across firms.  In addition, export taxes are included because heavy 
export taxes may have been responsible for  pushing fringe exporters out 
of the market. When the variation in costs across exporting is  assumed to 
be constant (i.e.,  captured by an intercept term), a  linear version of the 
determinants of the number of exporters is given by 
(13) 
where (}t  is the proxy for the degree of collusion, ilt  is the price elasticity of 
export supply (equation 11),  t~ is the tax rate on coffee exports, and N t- 1 
accounts for  partial adjustment in entry and exit.  Substituting equation 
(12) into (13) and solving for Nt yields the following expression: 
Nt  =  (1 -l'lAd-1{l'o + 1'1(Ao + Ant + A30l + A4BOARDt + 
(14) 
Substituting equation (12), and using the price elasticity of supply obtained 
via equation (11), we obtained an econometric version of equation (7) which 
denotes market equilibrium in the absence of binding ICA export quotas: 
Pt=  Pw(1  __ - tf)-!?1ct  ,(1.5) 
(1 + (Ao + A1Nt + A2Yt + A30"r + A4BOARDt + A5QUOT  Ad/ill) 
9 where Aj  represents the parameters to be estimated in this equation.  Given 
the possibility of a dichotomous market solution, under nonbinding or bind-
ing ICA export quotas, let the observed farm-level price be given by 
(16) 
where Ptica  is the prevailing price under a binding export quota and Pt is the 
unconstrained market solution given in equation (15).  To account for  the 
dichotomous solution, a dichotomous variable, denoted by 'lj;, is introduced. 
'lj;  is  a  binary variable that equals  1  in years  where  the ICA  quota was 
binding an otherwise higher level of exports and it equals 0 in years where 
there  was  no ICA  quota or where despite having a  quot.a,  exports were 
significantly below  the ICA quota anyway.  If the ICA quota is  binding, 
then Ptica  corresponds to the observed farm-gate coffee price.  However, if 
the ICA quota is  nonbinding, then Ptica  is  above the observed price which 
is given by Pt. 
Data and Estimation 
The model was applied to aggregate time-series data for the Haitian cof-
fee market for the years 1954 to 1984.  Major data sources included Seguino 
for  coffee production and prices, export volume and number of firms, and 
marketing costs.  USAID reports provided information on hurricanes. Other 
data came fr0111  Capital Consult on further farm data and reports by the 
International Coffee Organizat.ion on international t.rade arrangements. 
Observed production was presumed to be a function of lagged and cur-
rent  coffee  prices,  current price  of corn and beans  (crops  competing for 
harvesting labor), recent hurricanes, and past levels of production (biennial 
10 cycle).  The effects of coffee prices and hurricanes were assumed to follow 
polynomial distributed lagged forms.  The quantity consumed domestically 
was  specified  as  a  function  of farm-level  price of coffee,  gross  domestic 
product (a proxy for consumers' income), and the Haitian Consumer Price 
Index (a proxy for the price of other commodities).  The demand function 
was specified in double-logarithmic form. 
Equations (9) and (10)  contain Pt  as a  regressor which, given the en-
dogeneity of this variable, may result in biased and inconsistent parameter 
estimates if the ordinary least squares technique is  applied.  The general 
instrumental variable estimator (GIVE), discussed by Harvey, is applied to 
Pt  by regressing it on a set of exogenous variables and using the predicted 
value (P/V)  as an instrumental variable.6  Thus, p/v  replaced Pt  in equa-
tions (9) and (10) to assure consistent estimates and supply and demand 
parameters were estimated via ordinary least squares. 
The supply and demand results were used to compute the price elasticity 
of export supply in equation (11).  Because equation (11) contains variables 
that  are endogenous  to  the pricing equation, instrumental variable (IV) 
estimates for these variables were used to compute export supply elasticity.7 
A farmers' income Laseypres index was constructed based on price data and 
a  Haitian coffee farm model.8  Since this index is partially based on farm-
level coffee price-the dependent variable in this equation-an instrumental 
(GIVE) variable was used in place of the income index. Standard deviation 
of the GIVE income estimate based on three lagged periods was computed 
to denote farm income uncertainty.  Class variables were utilized for  the 
BOARDt  and QUOT  At.  Perfect foresight  by exporters was assumed by 
making '1/.'  =  1 for periods where exports fell within 10 percent of the export. 
ICA quot.a.  Because the ICA quotas were found t.o  be binding only in {our 
11 years of the sample, they were excluded from the final estimation sample, 
making equation (15) rather than (16) the relevant one for estimation. 
Equations (14) and (15) constitute a recursive system given that Nt is 
the dependent variable in the first one and a regressor in the second. In ad-
dition, the equations contain nonlinear parametric restrictions.  Given this, 
the parameters in both equations were estimated with the Full Informa-
tion Maximum Likelihood technique because it is the only known efficient 
estimator for simultaneous models that are nonlinear in their parameters.9 
Results are presented in the following section. 
Empirical Results 
Parameter estimates and selected statistics for the total domestic supply 
and demand functions (equations (9)  and (10))  are presented in Table 1. 
In general,  these results were plausible and consistent with theory.  The 
critical slope parameters were significant at the 5 percent level and had the 
expected signs. Furthermore, the supply parameter estimates are consistent 
with the findings of Wickens and Greenfield. 
Table 2 contains the parameter estimates for the equations of the num-
ber of exporters and pricing behavior (equations (14) and (1.5)).  All  the 
estimated coefficients for the number of exporters were significant at the 10 
percent level and, 3 out of 5 were significant at the 5 percent level, and all 
had the expected sign.  While the conjectural elasticity-a proxy for degree 
of collusion- can be expected to have a  negative sign to reflect entry deter-
rence by incumbent firms,  a  positive sign in the results here may reflect 
exit deterrence by incumbent finns via collusion.lO  The negative effect  of 
export supply elasticity on the number of exporters was confirmed.  Since 
coffee  production in Haiti  has  been stagnant for  the most part while  do-
12 mestic consumption has grown significantly, the price elasticity of export 
supply has increased while the quantity of coffee available at a given price 
has decreased.  The decline in the volume of exports is  thus followed by a 
decline in the number of exporters necessary to sustain the export market. 
The export tax rate was also confirmed as an important force driving ex-
porters out of business.  Finally, the coefficient associated with the lagged 
number of exporters indicates a relatively high degree of friction or partial 
adjustment in export entry/exit decisions. 
Four out of six of the estimated coefficients of the pricing equation (con-
jectural elasticities  parameters) were significant at  the 5  and 10  percent 
levels.  The number of exporters was found to have a  negative and signif-
icant effect  (at the 5  percent level) on the conjectural variation elasticity 
and, thus, a  positive effect on price.  This result confirms the conventional 
structure-conduct-performance paradigm of industrial organization in that 
strategic pricing behavior is more likely to occur the more concentrated the 
industry is.  The results also support Lundahl's argument that risk rather 
than income level may result in market power in informal credit markets. 
The level offarmers" income was found to have a negative but insignificantly 
different from zero effect (at the 10 percent level) on conjectural elasticity. 
This insignificant result is consistent with the fact that the share of coffee 
in farm income has been declining due to expansion in the production of 
grains (Seguino) which has weakened the market power position of coffee 
intermediaries. Farm income variability (standard deviation of income) had 
a positive and significant effect (at the 5 percent level) on conjectural elas-
ticity, and, thus, a negative effect on farm-level coffee price.  The direction 
of the effect indicates that producers' preference for security is a significant 
source of oligopsony power. 
13 The impact of the creation ofthe Export Board Association (BOARDd 
failed  to show a  significant impact on conjectural elasticity.  It should be 
noted  that  the  creation of the  Board occurred  during a  time  when ex-
porters were exiting the market.  The increase-in-concentration effect may 
have already been captured by the Nt  variable.  Also,  the creation of the 
board coincided with stiff increases in export taxes (1960-63 had the highest 
tax rates in the sample), which also affected concentration. The creation of 
the internal-quota administration mechanism within the Board Association 
(QUOTAt ), however, shows a  positive and significant effect  (at the 5 per-
cent level) on conjectural elasticity and, thus, a negative effect on farm-level 
coffee price.  Unlike the board, this institutional change was not followed by 
an increase in export taxes. The quota mechanism also allows more expLicit 
collusion among exporters than the board itself because exporters agree on 
the magnitude of an internal quota assigned to each exporter. 
Table 3 presents the estimates of conjectural and export supply elastic-
ities and the resulting Lerner indexes.  In general, the conjectural elastici-
ties were found t.o  be moderate and their mean value (.08) was comparable 
to those estimated from other studies that have used the Appelbaum ap-
proach. For example, the mean value of the conjectural elasticities reported 
by  Taylor and Kilmer for the Florida celery industry was .083, while Ap-
pelbaum reported .037 mean conjectural elastic.ity for the textile industry. 
Azzam et al.  and Schroeter reported lower conjectural elasticities for the 
U.S.  meat-packing industry (.024 in both cases).  The regional estimates 
for  the same indust.ry reported by  Schroeter (.099)  and those for  the to-
bacco and machinery industries (.402 and .200) reported by Appelbaum are 
higher than the ones reported here.  Note that for the years where t.he leA 
quotas were effective  the est.imated conjectural elastic.it.y  was  higher t.han 
14 in other years.  Thus, given the st.ructure and institutions in the Haitian 
coffee market, effective international coffee cartels result in greater collusion 
among exporters in agreeing how  to share the ICA quota.  The ultimate 
consequence of this is lower farm-level prices. 
Although the  Lerner indexes  varied  substantially from  year  to  year, 
there is  no apparent trend.  Reflecting the effects  of the ICA  quotas on 
conjectural elasticities, these indexes were higher in the years of effective 
ICA quotas. Their mean value was .551 for the years when the leA quotas 
were effective vis-a-vis .357 in other years. To the knowledge of the authors, 
the only available and comparable oligopsony indexes are those presented 
by Schroeter.  His estimates were much lower than the ones reported here 
(.0661 for the regional and .015 for national meat packing). Nonetheless, the 
oligopoly indexes reported by Appelbaum were much lower (rubber, textile, 
and electric machinery), except for the one for the cigarette industry (.65). 
Finally, the lack of trend in the Lerner index (Lt = Ot/7Jt)  may be due to 
the fact that both the conjectural and export supply elasticities (Ot  and 7Jd 
have been generally increasing over the sample period. 
Concluding Remarks 
This paper presents a methodology for measuring the degree and deter-
mining the sources of oligopsony power, utilizing the Haitian coffee market 
as a  case study.  Other features of the model developed include the incor-
poration of more plausible explanatory variables for pricing behavior than 
previous work,  linkages  to  the world  market,  and endogenization of the 
number of exporters operating in the market. 
In general, the empirical results support.ed t.he  model specified and t.he 
various hypotheses drawn from the lit.erature on sources of oligopsollY power 
1.5 and determinants of the number of firms.  The more significant sources of 
oligopsony power in the Haitian coffee market were found to be the number 
of exporters (concentration), farm income variability (a partial proxy for 
credit needs), and the creation of a quota-adminstration system among ex-
porters. Although the degree of oligopsony power and conjectural variation 
elasticities were found to be moderate, they increased when export quotas 
imposed by the International Coffee Agreement binded exports. 
The results also point out some interesting conclusions on the determi-
nants of the number of exporters.  Collusion among exporters was found to 
be a  significant mechanism for  keeping themselves in business in face of a 
declining export supply market.  Thus, while a lower number of exporters 
increase pricing collusion in the market  (via conjectural elasticities),  the 
effect  of collusion on the number of the exporters is  positive.  The main 
reasons for exporters going out of business are the high export taxes im-
posed by the Haitian government and the fact that farm-level export supply 
has become more price-elastic as  domestic consumption has grown faster 
than the relatively stagnant total farm supply. 
The analysis helps clarify several important consequences of government 
policy alternatives in the Haitian coffee  market.  Conventional economic 
theory suggests that higher export taxes shifts down the exporters' derived 
demand for coffee resulting in lower farm-gate prices under nonzero farm-
level price elasticit.y  of supply.  An additional hidden cost is  that higher 
taxes  put fringe exporters out of business, increase concentration in the 
market,  and  thus result in greater  collusion among remaining exporters 
and even lower farm-gate prices.  The lack of access to competitive financ-
ing in rural areas not only results in supranormal finance  charges by in-
termediaries, but also in lower farm prices via oligopsony power generated 
16 by these financial arrangements.  The exporters' board and internal quota 
administration are important purchase coordination mechanisms that were 
apparently created with the purpose of deterring the exiting of exporters. 
Although effective international cartels are usually  beneficial  to member 
countries, their impact on income redistribution among market participants 
needs to be qualified.  In the case of the Haitian coffee market (character-
ized by a  large number of peasant farmers,  a  relatively small number of 
exporters and the exercise of oligopsony power) the export quotas imposed 
by the International Coffee  Agreement  which are effective in restraining 
exports have an adverse impact on farmers as they accentuate oligopsony 
power and result in lower farm-gate prices. 
17 FOOTNOTES 
1  Coffee is  the main cash crop of Haiti, accounting for 36  percent of the 
value of exports.  The Haitian government imposes a  tax on exports 
every year, which has ranged between 16 and 43 percent of the export 
price of coffee  between 1959 and 1984.  The government also issues 
licenses to all intermediaries. 
2  In the oligopoly case presented by  Appelbaum,  the  Lerner index (the 
ratio of conjectural variation elasticity to price elasticity of demand) 
ranges from 0 to 1 because an economically rational monopolist op-
erates in the elastic portion of the demand curve.  In the oligopsony 
case,  there is  not an equivalent situation.  Under nonnegative price 
elasticity of supply, the lower bound on the Lerner "index" is  0 and 
t.he  upper bound is 1/T].  The Lerner index will be greater than 1 un-
der perfect collusion (f)  =  1) and price-inelastic supply.  An intui  tive 
way of thinking about the L-index for  the oligopsony case is  that it 
expresses the noncompetitive markup (V  M Pi - P) as a percentage of 
the price paid to the suppliers (P). 
3  The assumption of equality of marginal marketing costs  across  inter-
mediaries ensures equality of value of marginal products as well, an 
analogue to  Appelbaum's assumpt.ions of equality of marginal costs 
in the oligopoly case.  This assumption implies constant marginal pro-
cessing costs, which in terms of Figure 1 implies a  flat VMP curve. 
However, t.he  basic conclusions regarding the analysis (the VMP-farm 
price gap) still hold.  Points along t.he  VMP curve coincide in t.erms 
of t.he  vertical axis but not.  in t.erms of out.put. levels.  Likewise, VMP 
18 and farm-gate price points are still distinguishable.  The assumption 
of equal conjectural elasticities at equilibrium does not imply  that 
all intermediaries have  the same conjectural functions.  This point 
was argued by Appelbaum in the oligopoly case and Schroeter in the 
oligopsony case.  Both assumptions allow industry-level analysis. 
4  Connor et al.  (pp.  237-239) review a  few  studies in which farm prices 
are linked to concentration ratios of food  manufacturers.  Brandow 
points out over 10 sources of market power in the food industry ap-
plicable to the selling case and to a lesser extent to the buying case. 
These sources include large financial resources, geographic extension 
over local markets, membership in an oligopolistic core,  concentra-
tion, elasticity of demand for the industry's product, and structure of 
buyers-especially their size and number. 
5  Coffee is  sometimes smuggled from the Dominican Republic into Haiti 
and  since  this  figure is  not  formally  reported,  it  may  cause some 
discrepancies in the data. 
6  Farm-level coffee  price was  regressed on the world price of coffee,  the 
price of corn,  the price of beans,  a  dummy variable for  hurricane, 
gross domestic product,  time,  population,  and the  consumer price 
index. The obtained R2  was 0.98. 
7  The empirical version for  the computation of export supply elasticity 
(equation (11)) was given by r,t  =  /3lP/V IQt + lallQUQt!  where /31 
and a1  are the estimated slope and elasticity for supply and ciemand, 
p/v  as defined before, and Qt  and Q~ are also IV-predicted values for 
these variables.  The inst.ruments used for t.he  latt.er two were lagged 
endogenous variables, time, CPI, and populat,ion. 
19 8  Following Franzel and Martin, farm income of a  typical  coffee  grower 
was divided into three categories:  coffee,  corn, and beans.  The in-
come shares for each category, provided by Franzel and Martin, and 
time-series on commodity prices were used to extrapolate farm income 
through the benchmark year (1983) and through the entire observa-
tion period. This ad hoc procedure was necessary due to unavailabilit.y 
of data on coffee farm income. 
9  A necessary but not a  sufficient condition for a recursive system is  that 
the equation-error covariance matrix is  diagonal or, conversely, that 
the off-diagonal elements are zero.  This property was tested with the 
covariance matrix obtained from the FIML results.  The Lagrangian 
multiplier test of Breusch and Pagan rejected the zero error covariance 
hypothesis at the 5 percent level. 
10  A  tentative conclusion from this is that collusion may be a  way of re-
taining firms in a  declining market.  It would be interesting to test 
this hypothesis in the U.S. agricultural industry.  Commodities that 
have been cartelized through federal or state marketing orders (some 
fruits, vegetables, and dairy products) for example, have shown more 
stability in numbers of producers than other types of subsectors, such 
as corn and wheat. production where the absence of supply coordina-
t.ion  may have allowed competitive market forces  and economies of 
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Figure 1.  The Haitian Coffee  Market  as a  Collusive Export Oligopsony Table 1.  Coefficient Estimates for  the Demand and Supply Equations 
Coefficient  Standard 
Equation  Variable  Notation  Estimate  Error  R2 
Supply  Intercept  1  1064.963**  194.008  0.52 
Coffee Price Lag 0  plV 
t  44.473**  18.096 
Coffee Price Lag 1  plV 
t-l  71.156**  28.873 
Coffee Price Lag 2  plV 
t-2  80.051 **  32.482 
Coffee Price Lag 3  plV 
t-3  71.156**  28.873 
Coffee Price Lag 4  plV 
t-4  44.473**  18.046 
Corn Price  Slt  -1084.466  403.978 
Bean Price  S2t  -83.245**  23.522 
Hurricane Lag 0  Dt  -65.644**  27.717 
Hurricane Lag 1  D t- 1  -49.233**  20.789 
Hurricane Lag 2  Dt- 2  -32.822**  13.859 
Hurricane Lag 3  D t- 3  -16.411 **  6.929 
Quantty Lag 1  Qt-l  -.438**  .176 
Quantity Lag 2  -Qt-2  .109  .180 
Demand  Intercept  1  1.856**  1.540  .66 
Log of Coffee Price  In(PfV)  -.286**  .093 
Log of GDP  ICPI  Zl  -.137  .292 
Log of CPI  Z2  .580**  .202 
Note:  Supply and demand parameters were est.imated via ordinary least 
squares.  The demand equations were in double-log form.  One and 
two asterisks indicate significance at.  t,he 10  and .5  percent. levels. 
22 Table 2.  Full Information Maximum Likelihood Parameter Estimates of 
the Number of Exporters and Pricing Equations 
Coefficient 
Equation  Variahle  Notation  Estimat.e 
Number of Exporters  Intercept  1  20.735* 
Conjectural Elasticity  (}t  69.704** 
Export Supply Elasticity  r,t  -29.240** 
Export Tax Rate  ta 
t  -27.606* 
Lagged Number of Exporters  Nt- 1  .533** 
Pricing  Intercept  1  .203** 
Number of Exporters  Nt  -.008** 
Farmers' Income  Yt  -.016 
Farmers' Income Variability  u
y 
t  .263** 
Board Association  BOARDt  .016 
Quota Administration  QUOTAt  .052** 
Note:  The corresponding equations are (14) and (15).  Because the leA 
quotas were found to be effective only in 4 years, these observations 
were excluded from estimation.  One and two asterisks indicate sig-














.020 Table 3.  Estimated Conjectural and Export Supply Elasticities and 
Lerner Indexes 
Export  Lerner 
Year  Conjectural  Supply  Index 
Elasticity (6d  Elasticity (Til)  (£1  = 6«!ii«)  Major Events 
1964  .030  .126  .238  Hurricane 
1966  .036  .160  .243 
1966  .031  .115  .268 
1967  .046  .162  .278 
1968  .020  .117  .171 
1969  .040  .192  .209 
1960  .053  .114  .466  Creation of Exporters Association 
1962  .072  .116  .631 
1963  .091  .206  .443 
1964  .075  .186  .402  Hurricane 
1966  .099  .175  .568  Effective ICA Quota/Hurricane 
1966  .095  .192  .498  Effective ICA Quota 
1967  .064  .211  .302  Hurricane 
1968  .061  .161  .377 
1969  .069  .186  .377 
1970  .069  .210  .327 
1971  .liO  .189  .636  Effective ICA Quota 
1972  .085  .209  .407 
1973  .076  .221  .342 
1974  .061  .232  .264 
1976  .071  .220  .324 
1976  .061  .263  .232 
1977  .138  .460  .299  Creation of Quota Administration 
1978  .147  .295  .499 
1979  .104  .300  .346 
1980  .105  .292  .358  Hurricane 
1981  .083  .367  .226 
1982  .077  .309  .248 
1983  .136  .271  .501  Effective ICA Quota 
1984  .090  .367  .244 
Note:  An asterisk indicates the years during which the ICA exports were  effective.  Thus,  the corre-
sponding estimated conjectural and export elasticities, as  well  as Lerner indexes, were imputed 
from the constrained solution at the quota level. The year 1961 was excluded due to unavailability 
of data. 
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